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      For most transition countries who want to transfer to a market-oriented system from the 
planned-economy, one of the most important features is to shrink the state-owned enterprises 
(SOE) and expand the private-owned enterprises(POE), such as had been experienced by the 
former Soviet Union and the socialist countries in Eastern Europe. The same thing is happening 
in China. Since China started reform and opening to the outside world in 1979,  Private-Owned 
Enterprises (POE) have grown dramatically and become a significant contributor to China’s 
economic growth. This paper describes firstly this great economic achievement, and then 
emphasizes its political consequences. The main conclusions are as follows: the prolonged 
prosperity of POE in China over two decades proved again that private property rights always 
generate higher efficiency than the public ownership system in which owners are ambiguous or 
unspecified. The great improvement of POE’s political status comes from both the state’s 
rational compromise and the POE’s positive participation due to the pressure of economic 
development on the government side and the security needs for property and human rights on the 
POE side. Overall, the political participation by POE is helpful to improve the democratic 
process of governmental decision making, which has been demonstrated both at local 
governmental levels and with budgetary issues. However, the risks of collusion between money 
and power call for formal institutional mechanisms which let all people express and protect their 
interests transparently and legally.  
 
POE’S Economic performance 
 
After the completion of the socialist restructure1 in 1956, POE’s almost disappeared in China. 
Since 1979, with the implementation of the national reform and opening policy, POE’s recovered 
gradually and achieved substantial growth. In 1989, POE’s appeared in the China’s statistical 
year book as a separate category. 
 
The economic size of POE 
The indicators which describe POE’s economic size include: the number of POE; the total 
registration capital2; the total value of production; the industrial fields entered by POE; and the 
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1 One of the fundamental characters of socialism is the public economy. After the establishment of the People’s Republic of 
China, the China Communist Party launched socialist restructure in 1953 around the country to transform private economy in all 
kinds of industries, such as manufacture, business and agriculture to public economy through confiscating, redeeming, joint 
operating and organizing the collective firms or communes. It was ended in 1956. 
2 In China, any enterprise should report and register to the State Administration for Industry and Commerce its minimum capital 
required by the state to be one of the necessary conditions when it began to operate. The number varied by the industries and the 
type of enterprise organization. For instance, the registration capital for production and wholesale enterprise is above 0.3 million 
Journal of the Washington Institute of China Studies, Fall 2006, Vol. 1, No. 2, p118-132 118 
China’s Private-Owned Enterprises: Economic Performance, Political Action & Fiscal Consequence 
 
GDP contribution. Three time points, 1989, 1995 and 2003, are selected to describe its growth 
trend.  
 
1. The number of POE. 
In 1989, the total number of POE in China was 90,581. In 1995, it reached 654,531. In 1998, it 
exceeded 1 million and in 2003 the number became 3,005,500. The annual growth rate is 32.18% 
(See table 1). 
 
 
Table 1: Growth of Number of POE (1989-2003) 3   
Year Number of POE Growth Rate 
% 
Year Number of 
POE 
Growth Rate 
% 
1989    90,581 -- 1997   960,726 17.27 
1990     98,141     8.35 1998     1,200,978 25.01 
1991 107,843           9.89 1999 1,508,857 25.64 
1992 139,633 29.48 2000 1,761,769 16.76 
1993 237,919 70.36 2001 2,028,548 15.14 
1994 432,240 81.68 2002 2,435,300 20.05 
1995 654,531 51.43 2003 3,005,500 23.41 
1996 819,252 25.17    
  Annual average growth rate               29.97% 
 
2. The total registration capital of POE4
     In 1989, the total registered capital of POE in China was $1.05 billion and the average capital 
per POE was only $11,537. In 1995, they reached $32,775 billion and $50,075, respectively.  In 
2003, they were $441.312 billion and $146,250, separately. The annual average growth rate is 
58.6%. (See table 2)   
 
     Table 2: Growth of Registration Capital (1989-2003)5
Year Registration Capital 
(billion) 
Growth Rate 
% 
Year Registration  Capital 
(billion) 
Growth Rate 
% 
1989 1.05  -- 1997 64.25 36.99 
1990 1.187  13.05 1998 89.975 40.04 
1991 1.538  29.57 1999 128.587 42.91 
1992 2.763   79.65 2000 166.35 29.37 
1993 8.512 208.07 2001 227.65 36.85 
1994 18.1 112.64 2002 309.45 35.93 
1995 32.775  81.08 2003 441.312 42.61 
1996 46.9  43.10    
Annual average growth rate                         59.42% 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
Chinese Yuan, and for consulting firms, it is above 0.1 million Chinese Yuan.  
3 China’s Private-Owned Enterprises Statistical Year Book, 2000-2001,page 554; 2002-2004.6, page 7 
4 Currency unit is the U.S Dollar, unless otherwise noted.  
5 Ibid page 554; 2002-2004.6,page 75 
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3. The total of value of production and retail sale of consumer goods 
In 1989, POE made $1.212 billion the value of production and $0.475 billion retail sale of 
consumer goods. In 1995, the two numbers were $28.688 and $12.575 billion, respectively.  In 
2003, they reached $251.038 and $132.536 billion. The annual growth rates are 51.71% and 
54.12%, separately (See table 3). 
 
        Table 3    Growth of Value of Production & Retail income (1989—2003)6       
Year Value of Production 
(billion) 
Growth Rate 
% 
Retail income 
(billion) 
Growth Rate  
% 
1989    1.212 --   0.475 -- 
1990    1.525   25.83   0.537   13.05 
1991     1.836   20.39   0.713   32.77 
1992     2.562   39.54   1.138    59.61 
1993     5.275 105.89   2.375 108.70 
1994 14.25 170.14   6.413 170.02 
1995    28.688 101.32 12.575   96.09 
1996    40.338   40.61 18.238   45.03 
1997    49.038   21.57 23.188   27.14 
1998    73.163   49.20 38.236   64.90 
1999    96.075   31.32 52.388   37.01 
2000            134.25   39.73 72.663   38.70 
2001 153.963   14.68 78.063     7.43 
2002 191.725   24.53 99.125   26.98 
2003 251.038   30.94       132.536  33.71 
Annual average growth rate                     51.12 --               54.37 
 
4 The contributing rate to GDP 
    In 1989, POE contributed less than 1% to GDP. However, in 2002, the proportion had become 
48.5%.7
 
The geographic distribution and   industrial fields entered by POE 
The research team, the Development of China’s Private-owned Enterprises, conducts the 
sample survey around China every two years since 1993.All these investigations showed the 
difference of geographic distribution of POE was distinct, which mean many more POE located 
in the south-east while not at inner land. For example, there were 8 provinces at the end of 2003 
that owned above 100,000 POEs and took 63.24% of the national POE total. The details are as 
follows: Jiangsu (343,680), Guangdong (323,077), Zhejiang (302,136), Shanghai (291,711), 
Shandong (228,554), Beijing (186,805), Liaoling (114,415) and Sichuan (110,359), Except 
Sichuan province, all of the rest locate at the coastal area. This kind of geographic advantage 
created wonderful condition for POE to develop export-related industry. In 2003, 74,443 POEs 
were involved in the export-oriented industry and made about $21.87 billion foreign exchange.  
                                                 
6 Ibid, page 555; 2002-2004.6, page 75. 
7For the former socialist economy bodies, POE’s  share of GDP varied from 20% to 80 % by country. For example, 20% in 
White Russia, 70% in Russia and 80% in Hungary. Shahid Yusuf, Kaoru Nabeshima, Dwight H. Perkins, the SOE’s Privatization 
In Transition China, China Financial and Economic Publishing House,2006, p4. 
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At the same time, the industrial range entered by POE are growing wider and wider. Besides 
the tertiary industry, POE recently had increased its share in the second industry rapidly. 
According to the sixth survey of China’s POE, at the end of 2003, manufacture, trade and 
restaurant were the main industries the POE engaged and the manufacture industry accounted for 
38.2% while trade and restaurant was 24%. In recent years, POE extended quickly to heavy and 
chemical industry, infrastructure, utility industries, and so on. Actually, some mega-POEs had 
occurred in metallurgical, auto and electrical industries. From 2003, some monopoly industries, 
like aviation, telecommunication, and infrastructure, opened to POE and POE has played more 
and more role in these areas. Two examples: in 2002, Shanghai Fuxi Inc. took over 99.35% share 
of Shanghai Luqiao, a listed stated-owned enterprise. In 2003, the Junyao Group purchased the 
Yichang airport at the 0.6B.price. Meanwhile, with special authority, POE even can enter the 
military industry where POE’s participation was seriously excluded before. 
 
The contribution to taxation revenue of POE 
With the development of POE, they made more and more contribution to the state taxation 
revenue. In 1989, POE provided only $0.014 billion taxation revenue to the state and just 
accounted for 0.05% of the national total taxation revenue. However, in 1995, the number 
reached $0.445 billion, and in 2003, it jumped to $17.353 billion8 (See table 4). 
 
         Table 4: Growth of Taxation Revenue of POE (1989-2003)9           
Year Taxation Revenue  
(billion) 
Growth 
Rate % 
Year Taxation Revenue 
(billion) 
Growth 
Rate  % 
1989 0.014 -- 1997 1.131   50.20 
1990 0.025   78.57 1998 2.038   80.19 
1991 0.043   72.00 1999 3.187   56.38 
1992 0.057   32.56 2000 5.18   62.54 
1993 0.131 129.82 2001 11.463 121.29 
1994 0.219   67.18 2002 11.82     3.11 
1995 0.445 103.20 2003 17.353   46.81 
1996 0.753   69.21    
  Annual average growth rate                69.50% 
      
The total of employees in POE 
In terms of the total employees, only 1.64 million people worked in all kinds of POE in 1989 
and just accounted for 1.1% of the total employee number. However, in 1995, 9.56 million 
people worked in POE, and in 2003, the number became 42.99 million and accounted for 32% of 
China’s total employees (See table 5). This situation is totally different from the SOE10. 
 
 
                                                 
8 In China, just the data coming from China’s Statistical Year Book doesn’t disclose completely the taxation contribution of POE. 
Besides the tax, the POE also provides the fiscal revenue to the state by extra fees, mandatory donation and etc., which are not 
included in the data of China’s Statistical Year Book.   
9 China’s Taxation Statistical Year Book,1989-2003 
10 Since 1998, China implemented the policy to the SOE, capturing the bigger and giving up the small and medium SOE. A lot of 
workers lost their job. 
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  Table 5: Employee Number of POE (1989-2003)11
             
Year 
Employee Number 
(million) 
Growth 
Rate % 
 
Year 
Employee Number 
(million) 
Growth 
Rate % 
1989 1.64 -- 1997 13.50 15.29 
1990 1.70    3.66 1998 17.10 26.67 
1991 1.84    8.24 1999 20.22 18.25 
1992 2.32 26.09 2000 24.06 18.99 
1993 3.73 60.78 2001 27.14 12.80 
1994 6.48 73.73 2002 34.09 25.61 
1995 9.56 47.53 2003 42.99 26.11 
1996 11.71 22.49    
  Annual average growth rate                27.59% 
             
     In brief, within 23 years, China’s POE experienced three periods:  recovery, growth and 
development. Since the 21st century, POE, provided about 50% of GDP and had become the 
strong engine of China’s economic growth and the main carrier of employment. 
 
The formation of the class of private entrepreneurs in China 
and its political action 
 
Private entrepreneur -- a new class in China12
    This remarkable economic performance induced the formation of a new class in China. In 
2002, the China Academy of Social Science released a research report, titled Structural changes 
of contemporary China .Taking career as the categorical criterion, this report divided people into 
10 classes: administrator (2.1%), manager (1.5%), private entrepreneur (0.6%), professional 
(5.1%), clerk (4.8%), individual businessman (4.2%), waiter and retail clerk (12%), worker 
(22.6%), farmer (44%), the unemployed (3.1%). 
    Within the 10 classes above, the private entrepreneurs accounted for the smallest part (0.6%) 
but have drawn the most attention in all walks of the society because of their noticeable great 
wealth. 
    The data of the fourth random survey about POE, conducted by the All-China Federation of 
Industry & Commerce (CFIC) disclosed that, currently, the median value of wealth owned by 
private entrepreneurs was $1.3 million, and 12.6% of private entrepreneurs’ wealth was above 
$10 million, 1.1% beyond $100 million. The same survey also demonstrated that the average 
registration capital of POE was $0.75 millions, but 273,000  POE’s  were above $1 million,  
201,700 POE’s were in the range from $1 to 5 million, 13,500  POE’s were above $10 million, 
219 were above $100 million. As a result, the report drew this conclusion: The group of China’s 
private entrepreneurs has shaped into a relatively independent class.  
                                                 
11 China’s Private-Owned Enterprises Statistic Year Book, 2000-2001, page 554:2002-2004.6, page 75 
12 The data and materials come from the research repot, Structural changes of contemporary China, posted at this website: 
http://www.china.com.cn/chinese/PI-c 
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    Any change in economic level will be transferred to the political level, sooner or later. With 
the increase of POE’s economic performance and the gradual maturation to be an independent 
class, its political action became more and more apparent. We can observe this issue from two 
aspects: the first is the change in POE’s political status in different periods since 1979; the 
second is POE’s positive participation and intervention in the political area. As a result, within 
23 years, POE’s political status has been changed dramatically.   
 
The change of POE’s political status 
1. from “the eliminated” to “the supplement of socialist economy” 
After the socialist restructure from the capitalist industry and business, the private economy 
almost disappeared in China, and in the following 20 years, the non-public economy was banned 
completely by the state. Since the reform in 1979, the state eased the regulation, as a result, 
individual businesses began to reappear both in cities and countryside. In rural areas, some 
people began to engage in selling or processing agriculture goods, and in the early 1980s, the 
village and town-enterprises came to the fore and made surprising achievement. In cities, the 
government also began to encourage and support the development of individual business, mainly 
forced by the urgent need to settle a great number of youth who came back to the city from the 
countryside and needed working opportunity13. In the early 1980s, some slightly bigger POE 
with above 8 employees and a substantial amount of capital occurred in some places. However, 
scholars had different opinions about its nature: socialist or capitalist?  And the government also 
had no clear idea about this issue. A typical example is the Amendment to the Chinese 
Constitution passed in December 1982, which just admitted that the individual business in cities 
and countryside was a supplement to the socialist public economy14, but kept silent about the 
POE. From 1983—1987, China’s POE entered a fast lane and made bigger and bigger progress 
in many provinces. For example, in Yangyuan, a city of Hebei province, the number of POE in 
1985 was 10.2 times the number in 1983; In Anhui province, the number of POE in 1983 was 
370, but in 1987 it became 1640, the growth rate was very fast. In the middle and late period of 
1980s, the value of production and the total retail income made by non-public sector had taken 
1/3 of the national total amount15 . The strong development of non-public sector challenged 
roughly the related legislation and policy and forced the China Communist Party (CCP) to 
address the issue. In November 1987, the 13th CCP National Congress enacted the policy to 
encourage the development of the non-public sector. Further, in April 1988, the National 
People’s Congress (NPC) amended the Constitution and added the clause “the state allows the 
POE to exist and develop within legal scope. The POE is the supplement of the socialist public 
economy. The state protects its legal rights and interest and in charge of guiding, supervising and 
regulating POE”.  At this moment, POE got legal status in China.  
 In 1992, Deng Xiaoping affirmed in his south-tour speech that the non-public sector made a 
great contribution to the cause of China’s reform and openness. In the same year, the 14th 
                                                 
13 During the Cultural Revolution, China was at a complete standstill, several million graduates from the high school and college 
couldn’t find a job in cities. In 1968, Mao called for the knowledge youth go to the countryside, and in the following decade, 14 
million graduates born and growing in cities were sent to countryside to engage in hard agriculture work. After the end of the 
Cultural Revolution, they rushed back to cities in succession.   
14 11 clause,  Chinese Constitution(1982)   
15 Zhang Houyi, Ming Lizhi, the report of China’s private-owned enterprise (1999), the social science academic press (China) , 
2000  edition, p. 239 
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National Congress of the CCP confirmed further the policy that the public economy was the 
main economic force, while the individual business, private and foreign enterprises were helpful 
supplements; all sectors would co-exist and develop in the long run. In 1993, the third session of 
the 14th CCP National Congress enacted the policy to establish the socialist market economy. 
When the political climate became better, the POE embraced an unexpected opportunity to 
develop them selves. The table 1-2 demonstrates that, in 1993 and 1994, the number of POE 
increased 70.36% and 81.68%, respectively, and the registration capital increased 208.14% and 
112.63%. 
 
2. from the supplement of the socialist public economy to an important component of the 
socialist market economy 
    The second improvement of POE’s political status took place in 1997 when the background 
reform of SOE entered a deep-water area touching the sensitive and complicated property rights 
issue. With the implementation of “seizing the larger and giving up the smaller”, “strategic 
restructure” and “firing the employees to improve the efficiency”, hundreds and thousands of 
workers lost their jobs in SOE and needed to look for new jobs urgently. Taking a look at the 
economic situation at that moment, only POE could shoulder the heavy burden. In 1997, the 15th 
National Congress of the CCP confirmed that, “the non-public economy is an important 
component of China’s socialist market economy”, which dramatically improved POE to “an 
important component” from “the beneficial supplement”. Just one year later, POE achieved an 
unbelievable score and satisfied the policy-makers very much. According to the investigation of 
the employment situation in 66 cities in 1999, conducted by the Ministry of Labor and Social 
Security, 65.2% of the unemployed laid off from SOE found their new job in POE. POE became 
a significant supporter of the reform of SOE and got unprecedented acceptability. In March 1999, 
the second session of the 9th NPC amended the Constitution again and admitted that all kinds of 
non-public enterprises, such as individual business, private enterprises operating in the legal 
fields, are important components of the socialist market economy.  
From the above description, we observed that, since the reform, China’s POE has made great 
changes in their political status, from an illegal to a legal one, and then to an important 
component of China’s socialist market economy. Surfacely, it seems that the CCP and the state 
granted all of these to POE, but in essence, all of these changes come from the internal high 
efficiency of POE and they happened to be in accordance with the government’s urgent need to 
recover and develop the economy. So, fundamentally, POE got the improvement mainly based 
on its outstanding achievement and contribution.  This point is very important, especially when 
we talk about the political action of POE below. 
 
The political action of POE 
Meanwhile, the private entrepreneurs in different areas participated and engaged in political 
activities. A careful observer can make sense of their many kinds of action, from the amendment 
of the Constitution to the day-to-day operation of local government. Especially, in a few 
provinces with developed POE, the private entrepreneurs had grouped together and taken part in 
the process of local government’s decision-making, which added to some extent democratic 
color to these local government’s operation. Actually, some people in China called it a silent 
revolution. 
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 1. Collective action: private property gained constitutional protection  
    In 2004, the most noticeable thing in China was that private property gained constitutional 
protection. The Amendment to the Chinese Constitution stipulated16  that the citizen’s legal 
properties are inviolable. This was regarded by many people at home and abroad as the most 
tremendous achievement in China’s constitutional history and caught a lot of attention. However, 
when we searched for the related documents, we were surprised greatly by the continuous efforts 
made by the all-China Federation of Industry & Commerce (CFIC), a national but quasi-official 
organization of non-public entrepreneurs. From 1998 to 2004, CFIC submitted proposals to the 
NPC three times and kept on demanding amending the Chinese Constitution to protect private 
properties.  
In early 1998, CFIC submitted the proposal to the first session of the 9th Chinese People 
Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), titled strengthening the property legislations to 
protect all kinds of properties, which included the following requirements: 
 
► amending the related clauses in the Chinese Constitution to make clear that both the 
socialist public property and the private property should be sacred and inviolable in order 
to realize the justice and equality of the law. 
► according to the requirement of the CCP’s related documents, removing  legislations 
which hinder the development of POE, and mapping out the law to protect citizen’s legal 
private property as soon as possible . 
    
 “However, at that moment, the POE didn’t play great role to the national economy, a lot of 
people didn’t agree with the proposal”.17 Therefore, this proposal failed to be accepted by the 
NPC. 
In 2002, CFIC submitted the same topic proposal again. Compared with the last one, this 
proposal had three points and every point sought to amend the Constitution. (In 1998’s proposal, 
only one point asked for amendment): 
 
►amending the related clauses in the Constitution to clarify that the state protects 
citizen’s property rights, forbidding any organization or individual from infringing 
illegally and damaging private properties. 
►adding a clause in the Constitution to protect firms, corporations and individual’s 
properties. 
►clarifying whether the properties of firms and individuals should be nationalized, what 
the conditions are and how to compensate owners. 
 
    The legislation committee in the NPC made a response to this requirement and promised, 
“according to the document of the 15th CPP National Congress and the “speech on July 1”, we 
will consider seriously both the need of China’s socialist economy and your requirement, to take 
                                                 
16 The 13th clause,  Chinese Constitution (2004)  
17 Sheng  Xiaohua, the deputy chairman of CFIC 
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action to establish relative institution”.18 In the same year, similar meaning words appeared in 
the report of the 16th CCP National Congress, “strengthen the legislation to protect the property 
rights”19 .On November 23, 2003, it was the first time in People’s Republic of China’s history 
that the concept, private property rights, appeared in the draft civil law that was submitted to the 
NPC for approval. 
    In 2004, the CFIC submitted the proposal to the NPC again and sought not only to amend the 
Constitution but also strengthen the related legislation. On May 14, in the second session of the 
10th NPC, the amendment to the Constitution eventually passed.  
Comparing the CFIC’s proposals with the Amendment to the Constitution in 2004, we would 
find that the basic content in the Chinese Constitution was similar to the proposals, except adding 
“legal” in front of the term “private property”.   
 
2. Individual’s action: joining positively all level of the NPC and the CPPCC 
    With the increasing of financial resources, not only CFIC but also single private entrepreneurs 
produced a strong desire to participate in political activities. In recent years, more and more 
private entrepreneurs took a seat at all levels of the NPC and CPPCC. In 1999, at the national 
level, 48 delegates in the NPC and 46 members in the CPPCC came from the non-public sector; 
at the provincial level, 372 in the NPC and 895 in the CPPCC came from the non-public sector; 
meanwhile, 3 private entrepreneurs took the position of the deputy chairman in the CFIC20. In 
2000, the CFIC conducted a survey and investigated randomly 3073 private entrepreneurs and 
declared that 1495 were either delegates of the NPC or committee members of the CPPCC, and 3 
private entrepreneurs were directors of the NPC, 22 were vice director, 433 were standing 
committee members, 69 were chairmen, vice chairmen or executive chairmen at all levels of the 
CFIC. Interestingly, 59 private entrepreneurs even took a position in the CCP and the local 
government department. In 2002 and all around the country, about 9000 private entrepreneurs 
became delegates of the local NPC, more than 30,000 were committee members of local CPPCC, 
and 233 became  executive committee members of the CFIC, 8 took the position of vice 
chairmen in the CFIC. In 2003, 15 private entrepreneurs were elected to delegates of the national 
NPC; 47 became committee members of the national CPPCC. At the same time, Yin Mingshan 
and Xu Guanju, two private entrepreneurs with a great amount of wealth, became deputy 
chairman of the provincial CPPCC, Chongqing and Zhejiang province, which created a lot of 
attention in China. 
We owe the dramatic increase of private entrepreneurs’ participating in political activities to 
the easing political climate in that period, but this is only on the one hand. On the other hand, it 
stemmed from private entrepreneurs’ strong desire to look out for their personal and property 
security. All of this sent a clear message that private entrepreneurs growing up on the edge of 
China’s socialist system had passed the primary phase just for money, based on the strong 
motivation of seeking  personal and property security, their political desire is becoming stronger 
and stronger. However, from the historical perspective and real experiences, it’s not enough for 
any class that wants to play a role in the national political life just depending on a few single 
                                                 
18 Mu  Jia, behind three proposals of  requiring amendment of Chinese constitution: a talk about the legislative  of  the  protection 
of  private properties,  China’s Privately Run Enterprises review, 2004-3, page 10-12 
19 Ibid
20 Li  Peilin, china’s society structure, the Social Science Academic Press(China), 2004 edition, page 334-5. 
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persons intervening occasionally in the current political system. To be a distinct class with a 
great number of members, it must be organized to participate in all levels of political negotiation 
as a group. Only in this way can it gain the sustained force to move forward. The rise of the 
Wenzhou Chamber of Commerce (WCC) gave us an exact example. 
 
 3. The rising of the third sector: take the Wenzhou Chamber of Commerce (WCC) as 
example 21
    Wenzhou, a city in Zhejiang Province, is located in the southeast coast of China. Because of 
its special geographic site, people living here have a long tradition to do business and engage in 
the small handicraft industries. Early in 1903, some chambers of commerce had occurred in 
Wenzhou. However, after the establishment of the P.R. China in 1949, like the fate of all social 
organizations, WCC experienced several periods of restructuring, shrinking and silence.  
Therefore, when China started to reform and open to the outside, there was not a chamber of 
commerce in Wenzhou any more.   
    After the release of Deng Xiaoping’s speech in south China in 1992, the WCC was reactivated. 
In this period the Wenzhou CFIC set up 19 industrial Chambers of Commerce, like furniture, 
clothes, glasses, hardware, artificial leather, etc. Even in some villages and towns,   Chambers of 
Commerce occurred, too. Since 1995, the WCC began to set up branches in other cities, firstly in 
Kunming, and then in Shenyang, Harbin, Changchun, Tianjing, Yingchun and Xian.  Actually, 
the WCC nowadays exists in almost all large and medium cities in China. By 2003, there were 
114 Chambers of Commerce in Wenzhou city. Plusing the number in counties and districts 
belonging to Wenzhou, there were together 321 Chambers of Commerce, which consisted of 
42,624 member firms that almost covered all kinds of industries in Wenzhou.22
    Different from those official or quasi-official social organizations in China, WCC in general 
are civil and self-administrated.  The firms join the WCC voluntarily and elect the leader 
democratically; the WCC hires staff, raises money and manages itself independently, which 
makes the WCC neither public nor private sector, but something between them, a third sector. 
We can observe its influences as the following:  
    Firstly, the WCC took over some economic administrative functions run by the government 
before. According to the conclusion of Yu Jianyin, these transferred functions include those, in 
terms of any particular industry, self-disciplined, self-examination or evaluation and price-setting. 
For instance, the Furniture Chamber of Commerce stimulated 27 regulations to administrate its 
member firms, and the Hardware Chamber of Commerce regulated the agreement to protect the 
member’s patent rights, a regulation that was commended by officials in the central government 
as a beneficial supplement to the Patent Law.     
    Secondly, to some extent, the WCC influences and participates in governmental decision-
making. The essence of the Chamber of Commerce is gathering the common interests scattered 
among single firms and seeking beneficial public policy. The WCC effectively gathered and 
                                                 
21 Data and cases in this section come from chiefly related chapters in the book, Between the Government and the Enterprises: 
take Wenzhou Chamber of commerce as case, written by Yu Jianxin, Zhejiang People’s Press, 2004  
22 At a whole, China’s Chamber of commerce is still in infant period .only in a few cities, like Wenzhou, merchants organized 
Chamber of Commerce according to different industries. Because Wenzhou merchants go to other places to do business and there 
are no Chamber of Commerce in these cities, they took their Chamber of Commerce to other cities. This situation is different 
from The U.S. 
 
Journal of the Washington Institute of China Studies, Fall 2006, Vol. 1, No. 2, p118-132   127    
China’s Private-Owned Enterprises: Economic Performance, Political Action & Fiscal Consequence 
 
filtered the single firms’ interests, transferred them to a particular requirement and input it into 
the government’s process of decision-making to seek the beneficial policy. For example, they 
provided detailed statistical data to the government, participated in the project of planning the 
particular industry’s development and helped the government to map out the entry condition and 
technology standard. Moreover, the WCC positively recommended private entrepreneurs to be 
candidates for the local NPC and CPPCC. For instance, in 2003 the WCC recommended 141 
private entrepreneurs to be delegates or committee members in the local NPC and CPPCC. On 
behalf of private entrepreneurs, they submitted 54 proposals and most of them were resolved 
satisfactorily. 
    Finally, the WCC strongly resisted some bad actions of the government. 
    In 1997 and 2001, when some vehicles of member firms were detained unreasonably in Anhui 
and Jiangshu Province, the Shipping Chamber of Commerce reported in a timely manner to the 
Wenzhou government, at the same time, on behalf of its member firms, they negotiated 
positively with the local governments where the vehicles were detained and eventually protected 
the member firms’ interests successfully. In Wenzhou, the Food Chamber of Commerce resisted 
the unreasonable fees collected by the government and eventually got the permission not to pay.  
The Retail Chamber of Commerce called its members to refuse to pay extra house rent and got 
an 800,000 Yuan exemption.   
Western political theory states that NGO are necessary precondition and important supporters 
to democracy and their diversity is helpful to improve the democratic structure of a society. In 
China, through taking over some governmental functions, recommending candidates to the NPC 
and CPPCC, submitting proposal, WCC injected a “public” element into the closed, one-way 
process of governmental decision making, which not only protects its own interest but also 
corrects governmental behavior and increases the acceptability of the public policy. It is on this 
point that we believe that POE represents an important force stemming from China’s internal 
society and probably can change China’s current political model from its root and will play an 
extraordinary role on China’s future.  
 
Fiscal Consequences 
 
Governmental finance lies on the boundary between politics and economics. The development 
of the economy determines the financial ability of the government, and in turn the political 
system decides how to allocate public money. From the state prospective, POE’s outstanding 
economic performance not only makes itself become the main contributor to GDP but also 
improve its political status. Meanwhile, in some provinces where POE develop very fast, POE 
further made itself the main provider of public money, more importantly, it also made itself the 
main beneficiary of some public policies. Unexpectedly, in a few provinces with developed POE, 
POEs have been proceeding to supervise and criticize the governmental budget, which 
unintentionally improved the democratic degree of the governmental operation in these 
provinces. We will take two provinces, Zhejiang and Guandong, as example to observe the fiscal 
consequence of POE.  
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The achievement of Zhejiang 
       Zhejiang Province is locates in the south-east coastal area and has poor natural resources. In 
the period of Planned Economy, the state invested very little in this Province with the 
consideration of its difficulty to defend. As a result, Zhejiang had a few big SOEs. However, 
people in Zhejiang have the strong tradition of business from Qing dynasty.  Since China began 
to reform and open to the outside, Zhejiang has become one of the most developed areas in 
China just by its geography, strong tradition and hard-working spirit. In 2003, there were all 
kinds of POE, 0.301M in number, and accounting for 10.05 % of the total national number. 
Compared with other Provinces, POE in Zhejiang has passed the scattered, small-sized and 
isolated stage, and is moving forward to collaboration. A great number of large groups, 
accounting for a big share in the domestic and oversea market have been established, such as 
ZHENTAI Group and DELIXI Group. In the list of China’s 500 top POE released in 2003, 188 
are located in Zhejiang, and in the same year, POE made 70.1% contribution to Zhejiang’s GDP. 
    The strong development of POE continually improved the financial ability of the Zhejiang 
government. Compared with other Provinces, the ability of Zhejiang’s financial self-support is 
number 1 in China. Since 1995, Zhejiang achieved a balanced budget in the past 10 years, and is 
the only Province in China to pay the salary of the administrators and teachers just with the 
provincial revenue. Until 2001, the annual fiscal revenue of 48 among the total of 62 counties 
reached 100 millions. This situation is completely different from other Provinces that were in 
terrible financial situation, partly because of the implementation of the Sharing-Taxation 23since 
1994.  
Meanwhile, the “public” color in Zhejiang governmental finance is much stronger than other 
provinces. Firstly, in recent years, the ratio of public expenditure/government expenditure in 
Zhejiang was higher than the average national level. From 1997 to 2001, the average ratio is 
above 60%, and the share of spending on education and health care accounted for 48.61%. 
Secondly, the coverage of governmental finance in Zhejiang was beyond state-owned enterprises 
and cities, but face to POE and rural people at the same time. For example, early in 1998, 
Zhejiang introduced the policy that, no matter if the firms are  public or private, if they engage in 
some special industries that the government favored, such as innovation, anti-pollution, energy 
saving, etc., the government would pay the interest to the banks instead of firms themselves and 
also provide related policy preferences. In 2004, Zhejiang became the first province in China to 
expand the scale of the minimum living guarantee to all citizens, covering the rural people. In 
Wenzhou, the government even covered all citizens in the retirement security net, and set up 
welfare buildings to take care of the senior and disabled people, which makes Wenzhou the first 
city in China to solve the difficulties for disadvantaged people of living, housing and health-care. 
 
 
 
                                                 
23 China employed Sharing-Taxation system in 1994.The main content are the following: based on the different responsibilities 
among all level governments, all kinds of taxation are divided into three categories: the central government’s revenue, the 
provincial government’s revenue and the sharing-revenue between them, some taxation generating mostly revenue, such as the 
value added tax and corporation income tax all belong to the sharing=taxation. Meanwhile, the central government will return 
and transfer some money to the provincial governments according to the number of the revenue and expenditure in 1993 and the 
practical financial situation, respectively. However, because of the limited transfer payment, most provincial governments are 
forced to face great financial gap and have tough financial situation after 1994.            
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The phenomenon of Guangdong  
    Guangdong Province is close to Hong Kong and is the bridge connecting China’s inner land 
with the outside world. Since 1979, Guangdong had become the “window” to the foreign 
countries and Shenzhen, a closest city to Hong Kong in Guangdong, was one of the economic 
special areas permitted by the central government. Taking advantage of the policy, a lot of POE 
enterprises grew up and engaged in the export-related industry and got great result. POE had 
early become the backbone to the provincial economy, and the amount of wealth owned by the 
private entrepreneurs was No.1 in China. In 2001, there were 2.85M non-public firms, including 
60,000 foreign investment corporations, 0.227 million POEs and 1.67 million individual 
businesses, which  realized 67.3 billion value of production and $1211.9 billion retail income, 
absorbed 8 million people to work and generated $225.3 billion taxation revenue to the 
government. Compared with Zhejiang Province, the size of Guangdong’s POE was much bigger, 
there were 300 POE with above 10 million registration capital and 41 beyond 100 million, 240 
corporation groups had been established.  
    The strong financial ability and the great taxation contribution enable the private entrepreneurs 
in Guangdong to surpass the phase of just waiting to be accepted by the government. Instead 
they have moved forward to the advanced position of being able to criticize and supervise the 
government, which unexpectedly speeded up the democratic process of the governmental budget. 
In Shenzhen, the first special economic zone in China, it was early in 1995 that its NPC set up a 
planning and budget committee. In the following years, the Shenzhen NPC stimulated a series of 
regulations, such as the regulation of examining and approving the plan and budget of 
Shenzhen’s economic and social development (1997), the supervising regulation of Shenzhen 
NPC Standing Committee (1999), the regulation of governmental procurement, and the 
regulation of governmental investment management (1998). In 1999, Shenzhen started the pilot 
departmental budget reform, the first such in China. In 2001, it extended the reform and covered 
1/3 of the governmental departments and then included all in 2002. In 2003, Shenzhen firstly 
introduced performance auditing and audited 4 mega-projects, disclosed some serious mistakes 
in managing the public money and started the public wave to fight the waste.                 
In Guandong Province, early in 1998, the financial committee, a subcommittee of Guangdong 
NPC, drafted a regulation on approving and supervising the governmental budget and was passed 
formally in 1999. The regulation required that the governmental budget must be made as detailed 
as possible. From 2001 t0 2003, the number of the government departments that employed the 
department–budget increased from 7 to 27 and then all, and  the pages of the budgetary report  
increased from a few pages to 144 pages and then to 605 pages. It was so detailed that even if the 
government bought a computer, its type and configuration must be shown in the budgetary report. 
In 2004, the internet of the Guangdong Bureau of Finance was connected to the net of the 
Guangdong NPC, which made the former totally become the “Glass wallet”. In 2005, the 
performance audit was employed in the whole Guangdong Province. 
The achievement of Zhejiang and the phenomenon of Guangdong typically demonstrated that, 
in contemporary China, the more advanced the private economy is, the better the governmental 
finance situation is; furthermore, the stronger the private economy is, the faster  the democratic 
process of the government budget is. The increase in democracy is not only shown by the 
increase in money spent on education and health, but also the general public, represented  by the 
private entrepreneurs, strengthened supervision and control over the governmental budget. Based 
on the viewpoint that the management of finance is the core and starting-point of all 
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governmental action, so any change in governmental finance just mirrored the change in China’s 
political and administrative situation. For many reasons, this kind of change is much more direct 
and apparent at provincial level than at the central government level.        
                                
Conclusions 
 
The resurrection and prosperity of the POE in China prove again that private property rights 
generate high economic efficiency. 
    One must admit that, in China’s reform, it was not the original intention to develop POE for 
the CPP and the state. By contrast, it is an unintended by-product that POE’s dynamic 
development and the increasing backbone role we observed above. In China, the core of reform 
is the reform of state-owned enterprises. From 1978 to now, the state has spent tremendous 
energy and a great amount of financial resource on SOE, and tried all possible methods to 
improve their economic performance. However, the result by far is not optimistic mainly because 
of the inherent inefficiency of the public property rights.   
    By contrast, all kinds of non-public economy, except some village and town-owned 
enterprises in some provinces, established a clear ownership structure from the first day when 
they were established, which provided sustainable incentive force and instantly led to dynamic 
growth. Actually, POE by far has become not only the main engine of China’s economic growth 
and the chief creator of working opportunity, but also  the main shoulder to bear the grave 
pressure generated by two facts, one that interim  WTO granted to China to protect its infant 
industries is close to the end, and the other China’s  rapid urbanization. People place huge hope 
on POE to play an important role to speed up the process of urbanization and optimize industrial 
structures. Therefore, China’s more than two decades of reform can be described as having two 
correlated parts: the shrinking of the SOE and the prosperity of the POE. 
     This reverse maybe an unintended result for the designer of China’s reform, but it is 
reasonable, especially in term of the nature of different property rights. China’s reform proved an 
unquestionable law again that had been justified again and again in human history:  private 
property rights always generate far higher economic efficiency than public property rights. 
 
The increasing political influence of POE in recent years comes from the private entrepre-
neurs’ positive effort to seek their personal and property security and the state’s reasonable 
compromise forced by the serious economic pressure under the new situation. 
    At the beginning of the reform in 1978, China’s economy almost reached the edge of collapse. 
When China opened its closed door to the outside world, the huge difference between the 
developed countries and the developing countries shocked Chinese leaders gravely. In the late 
1980s, the new informationalization and globalization occurring in developed countries enlarged 
the possibility to sharpen this difference further. At the same time, after two decades of 
unbalanced economic growth, China is encountering the serious disparity among the different 
areas and between cities and rural areas. All of these forced the Chinese government to shift its 
emphasis to develop the economy. Under this situation, POE’s outstanding contribution to GDP, 
taxation revenue and employment are greatly subject to the new urgent needs of the state and 
thus get a big space to survive and develop.     
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Like in any times, the private entrepreneurs always produce strong political desire after they 
make great profit. In P.R. China, the state suppressed the private economy for several decades, so 
the unsafe feeling of private entrepreneurs was extremely strong. Therefore, once they passed the 
initial phase of making money, private entrepreneurs shifted quickly to the political area in order 
to seek security for their personal properties. Basing on their economic contribution, taking the 
organization form of Chamber of Commerce, through the channel of the NPC and CPPCC, 
private entrepreneurs have positively intervened in the national political life and rapidly became 
a noticeable player. As mentioned above, they had played a significant role in China, up from 
amending the Constitution and down to participating in the daily operation in the local 
government, etc. 
 
The political activities of private entrepreneurs are helpful to improve China’s democracy. 
However, it is urgent to introduce public and institutional mechanisms to let people express 
their interests legally. 
    All kinds of non-public sector’s political participation had changed the model of Chinese 
government’s design-making, shifting gradually from one-side to multi-side participation. In the 
short term, it can not only improve the acceptability of public policy but also correct the behavior 
of the government. In a long run, this participation of the taxpayer injects the democratic element 
into the governmental operation, which will have a tremendous and profound influence on 
China’s democratic politics and public finance.  
    However, if there is no public and institutional mechanisms to let all people of the society 
express their interests, it is possible that the private entrepreneurs’ rational process of seeking 
personal and property security will lead to the dangerous collusion between power and money. 
Actually, this problem has already occurred; we can observe it from the selling of the SOE, the 
requisition of agricultural land and monopoly in some marketplaces. Speaking deeply, it is not 
that private entrepreneurs should not protect their own interests, and not that POE is the source 
of the evil, but how to accommodate other people’s interests when private entrepreneurs realize 
their interests. This process, in essence, is the process whereby all people in the society voice 
their interest publicly and legally. In other words, it is the process of introducing and establishing 
democracy. For today’s China, the most urgent task is to establish this institutional democratic 
mechanism as soon as possible. Only in this way, on the one hand, can China make good use of 
POE’s economic advantage, and on the other hand, restrain their great profit-making impulse 
into a controllable area to prevent serious social unrest.  
Journal of the Washington Institute of China Studies, Fall 2006, Vol. 1, No. 2, p118-132 132 
